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AF/SA

REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE
MONITOR'S ARTICLE TITLED,

US-SOVIET
MILITARY
FACTS

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Review of The Defense Monitor's Article Titled,"US-Soviet Military Facts"
October 1982


While The Defense Monitor article (Vol XI, No 6, 1982) has a collection of statements regarding relative military powers of the US and the Soviet Union and their allies it is not "an up-to-date assessment of the many elements of US and Soviet military strengths and weaknesses" on which to base important national defense policy decisions. This review is written as a note of caution on the assessment shortfalls which limit the value of The Defense Monitor article

The Strategic Balance

Strategic forces must be assessed in terms of the mission they are expected to perform. For the US, the mission has always been deterrence.

Three decades ago the US nuclear superiority was unquestioned. Today we have parity with the Soviet Union. Tomorrow's balance is yet to be determined and will be based on our resolve to pursue a strategic force modernization program designed to develop and deploy systems which can survive the Soviet threat.

Figure 1 is a comparison of NATO/USSR strategic capability in terms of delivery systems. As the chart reflects, the gap between NATO/USSR delivery capability continues to increase in favor of the Soviets.

TOTAL STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS

(a) USSR figures include Soviet strategic missiles and BEAR, BISON, and BACKFIRE bombers; the BACKFIRE bomber has been included in this figure because it has an inherent intercontinental capability although in its maritime and European land-attack roles it poses a serious threat to NATO Europe.

(b) NATO figures include United States strategic missiles, 64 British strategic POLARIS SLBMs and United States B-52s and FB-111s. The United States-based FB-111 is included because it has a strategic mission.

Figure 1

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
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Complementing this growing disparity in delivery systems is a marked increase in Soviet strategic warheads, made possible by the fact that the Soviets are now able to convert the significant advantage they have had in missile throw weight to increased numbers of smaller, more accurate strategic weapons (Figure 2).

STRATEGIC WARHEADS



(a) If all USSR missiles were MIRVed to their tested capability the number of Soviet warheads would total some 8500.

Figure 2

The fact that the Soviets have a significant advantage in missile throw weight allows them to continue to increase the number of nuclear weapons that can be delivered as their guidance technology improves. This increase in numbers dictates that the US must continued to pursue more survivable and capable weapon systems to counter the evolving threat and make our deterrent capability credible.

In addition to size and accuracy improvements, the Soviets have pursued the development of a vast array of new delivery systems, and continually have several systems under development simultaneously (Figure 3).




Figure 3

In addition to the trends and development reflected above--which directly challenges the credibility of The Defense Monitor article--several other major points are either misleading or omitted from the article.

ARTICLE: "U.S. solid fuel-propelled MM ICBMs can be launched against the Soviet Union well within the 30 minute time of flight of Soviet missiles."

COMMENT: The inference is that the US has or should adopt a preemptive or launch under attack strategy both of which would be very destabilizing. Even if the US were to launch under attack, the time to escape initial detonations is much less than 30 minutes.

ARTICLE: "All 376 operational U.S. strategic bombers are modern high speed jet aircraft."

COMMENT: Of the total US bomber force, 316 are B-52 aircraft, the newest of which is 20 years old. These "modern" bombers compare in age to Soviet Bear and Bison long range bombers.

ARTICLE: The Soviet Strategic Bomber force of 145 planes still includes 100 old, slow, propeller aircraft.

COMMENT: The Soviet strategic bomber force consists of 150 Bear and Bison aircraft and steadily expanding Backfire forces. The Backfire has sufficient range to attack the U.S. by using post-strike recovery in Cuba or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. Long range air-to-surface missiles have been deployed, and new bombers and tankers are projected in the eighties. The Soviets have in development a new strategic swept-wing bomber. Additionally, they are modernizing their older aircraft with new communications and navigation equipment plus new weapons.

ARTICLE: "The U.S. will build an advanced technology "Stealth" bomber at tremendous cost to replace the B-1."

COMMENT: Ultimately, when the US builds the "Stealth" Advanced Technology Bomber, or ATB, the Soviet's strategic defense problems will be maximized by a combination of US threats. The ATB, with its extremely low radar profile; the B-1B, with its combination of low radar profile and extensive electronic countermeasures; and the cruise missile, deployed in large numbers, will negate any Soviet defensive improvements and revitalize our strategic deterrent.

ARTICLE: "Of the over 12,000 U.S. nuclear weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union, over 2,600 are on F-111's, F-4's, A-6's, A-7's and other "tactical" aircraft which could fly to the Soviet Union from Europe, Asia, or from aircraft carriers;..."

COMMENT: While tactical aircraft could penetrate the Soviet Union's borders, the percent of critical targets they can put at risk is limited due to operational ranges.

COMMENT: Existing US defense capabilities are not detailed in the article or compared to Soviet defense forces. The Soviets have deployed more than 7000 air defense radars, 2500 interceptors, some 10,000 SAM launchers, and 32 ABM launchers. By contrast, the US deploys less than 120 air defense radars, no SAMs for defense of CONUS, less than 300 interceptors (mostly 1950s vintage), and no BMD defense. Essentially, we have no means by which to limit damage to the US except through enforcement of deterrence--best achieved by influencing the Soviet perception that they cannot achieve their objectives.

Tactical Nuclear Forces

A direct link between the deterrent capability of strategic nuclear and conventional forces is the theater nuclear forces (TNF). These forces contribute to deterrence by creating uncertainty for the aggressor concerning US and Allied response. NATO nuclear initiatives have not kept pace with Soviet modernization efforts. That fact is not obvious from The Defense Monitor article.

ARTICLE: "The US has 6000 nuclear weapons in Europe, excluding those on ships and submarines."

COMMENT: The 6000 warheads in Europe cited in the paper for the US actually include allied deployment, and are in fact a decrease of 1000 warheads from FY1981.

ARTICLE: "The USSR/NATO balance in MRBMs/IRBMs is 600 to 180."

COMMENT: This assertion fails to take into account the limited short range of NATO Pershing and upcoming GLCM missiles as compared to the intermediate/medium range of the MIRVed SS-20 force (Figure 4).

**TARGET COVERAGE OF SOVIET SS-20 AND
TARGET COVERAGE OF NATO PERSHING II AND GLCM**





Figure 4

ARTICLE: "The Soviet MRBM/IRBM force has 1/3 less total megatonnage than it had in 1970."

COMMENT: This statement is misleading in that it ignores the Soviet modernization towards the SS-20 with its multiple warhead capability and greater accuracy, the combination of which allows decreased megatonnage, but more effective usage and a greater target coverage (Figure 5).



Includes operational SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20. There were no NATO deployments during this period. Excludes refire missiles and additional warheads.

NATO decided on 12 December, 1979 to deploy 572 missiles (108 Pershing IIs; 464 GLCMs) beginning at the end of 1983. Implementation of this decision can be altered only by a concrete and effective arms control agreement. These deployments will be cancelled if the Soviets will dismantle all their SS-20 missiles and retire all their SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.

Figure 5

Conventional Forces

US and allied conventional forces are maintained to defend vital interests, deter aggression, and promote stability. Loss of US strategic nuclear superiority and the growing Soviet advantage in theater nuclear forces have further increased the deterrent responsibilities of US and allied conventional forces.

Static force comparisons clearly indicate that the Warsaw Pact will maintain a numerical advantage over NATO in many categories. This advantage does not imply that the Pact could confidently expect to succeed in a conventional attack on Western Europe. NATO's strategy of flexible response, combined with modern weapons and force readiness and sustainability, provide a deterrent to the Warsaw Pact. However, relative force levels are important.

ARTICLE: "The Warsaw Pact has more than a 2-1 edge over NATO in the total number of tanks. The Warsaw Pact has only a 1.54-1 advantage in main battle tanks in Europe."

COMMENT: While The Defense Monitor article correctly states that the Warsaw pact has an advantage in tanks, this advantage is greatly underestimated and does not take into account the total imbalance in all areas of armament as reflected in Figure 6.

NATO-WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISON

(IN PLACE IN EUROPE)




Figure 6

- The Warsaw Pact currently has a 3 to 1 advantage in tanks over NATO and is expected to widen that margin despite the deployment of several new NATO tanks, including the US M-1.

- The Pact has exceeded NATO's modernization program by wider deployment of T-64 and T-72 tanks and continuing deployment of a new, more capable tank, designated the T-80.

- This advantage is widening based on a continuing imbalance in tank production.

-- The Soviets produced 2500 tanks in 1980 and have continued production at this pace during 1981 and thus far in 1982.

ARTICLE: "NATO has invested heavily in anti-tank weapons and leads the Warsaw Pact in both the quantity and quality of such weapons. NATO deploys over 50 types of anti-tank weapons and a total of almost half a million."

COMMENT: US/NATO does not have the advantages in anti-tank weapons. Based on the quantitative advantage in tanks by the Warsaw Pact, the ratio of anti-tank weapons per tank significantly favors the Pact.

- This imbalance in favor of the Pact continues to grow and is exacerbated by Pact development of more accurate tube launched anti-tank missiles with greater range and penetrativity.

- As a result of this imbalance, NATO relies on close air support aircraft and helicopters--one of the few areas where NATO has a numerical advantage--to defeat enemy armor. Unfortunately, a rapid increase in the Pact's helicopters will overturn this advantage by the mid-80s.

ARTICLE: "One of the greatest advantages the U.S. has over the Soviet union is its air refueling capability. The U.S. has over 600 KC-135 tankers to extend the ranges of its long-range bombers and other aircraft. The Soviets have 30 long-range tankers."

"The U.S. will soon add to its strategic mobility and air refueling capacity by buying new KC-10 tankers and re-engining 300 KC-135s."

COMMENT: Based on the geopolitical advantages of the Soviet Union and as a counter to the significant build-up of Soviet forces in the immediate proximity of areas considered vital to our national interest (i.e, Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia), the US is pursuing a major expansion of airlift/refueling capabilities. The geographical dissimilarities between the US/NATO and the USSR are significant (Figure 7) and must be addressed in terms of increased, responsive strategic airlift. With the current threat to vital resources, the choice is to provide the military forces needed to protect our

interests or to risk a reallocation of resources that will drastically alter the way we and our allies live.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISSIMILARITIES A NATO PROBLEM




Figure 7

Additional Special Soviet Capabilities

Several special Soviet capabilities were not addressed in The Defense Monitor's article. These include chemical and biological weapons, defense mobilization capabilities, and special warfare operations.

- The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union (and the Warsaw Pact, in general) are better equipped, organized, and trained than any other military forces in the world to conduct chemical warfare operations.

-- The Soviet inventory of chemical weapons and the number of personnel assigned to conduct chemical operations far exceed those of the US/NATO, and reflect both a capability and a resolve to use agents should the need arise.

-- Soviet doctrine calls for the use of toxic CW agents in both offensive and defensive situations.

-- Their use of live lethal chemicals in training not only adds realism but also confirms a high standard of preparedness.

- The Soviet Union has created a mobilization system which integrates government agencies, the economic sector, the general population, and transportation systems.

-- The system is geared for a rapid build-up and wartime commitment of military units and other resources to achieve a quick victory.

-- They have established sizeable stockpiles of consumable supplies and war reserve equipment.

- The Soviets maintain numerous special purpose forces for a variety of sensitive missions in both peace and war.

-- These forces include the KGB, Special Security Troops, and other special groups such as the GRU, Special Purpose Troops (SPETSNAZ) capable of sabotage against NATO and US key political, military, and economic targets.

Military Spending

Comparisons of US and Soviet defense spending provide a rough, but useful, measure of the US-Soviet military balance. Comparisons of military investment--that portion of spending allocated to buying weapons; facility construction; and research, development, and test and evaluation (RDT&E)--are of special importance because a prolonged disparity in military investment leads eventually to disparities in fielded military capabilities.

That disparity is shown in Figure 8. Although US outlays during the last decade remained relatively constant, the Soviets RDT&E costs more than doubled between 1971 and 1981.




Figure 8

ARTICLE: "The Administration proposes spending 1.9 trillion dollars over the next six years on the military. This means we will spend \$36 million every hour for the next six years. It will cost a total of more than \$20,000 for every taxpayer in America."

"Seventy-eight percent of all discretionary spending in the federal budget goes to pay for the military."

COMMENT: The inference in such a statement is that the defense budget is far outstripping all other budget outlays. That is simply not the case. Consider the FY83 defense budget. While the FY83 defense budget is large at 6 percent of the GNP, it must be asked--relative to what? Under Eisenhower it was 10-11 percent of GNP; under Kennedy, prior to Vietnam, it was 8 percent. Defense spending in the USSR will claim 15 percent of their GNP. At that rate, even the President's planned increases in the defense budget will not stop the gap between Soviet and US military investment.

ARTICLE: "The US and its NATO allies have outspent the Soviet/Warsaw Pact military forces for many years--\$256 billion to \$202 billion in 1980 alone."

COMMENT: Evaluation of the overall defense investment balance should reflect the allied defense contributions for both sides. In general, NATO Allies add substantially to the Western effort, both in terms of general defense activity and investment. However, in evaluating contributions of US Allies to the military balance, two things should be noted. First, most of the Allied spending is for general purpose forces; solution of the strategic force imbalance problem is thus largely a US responsibility. Second, largely because the forces and production capabilities of the Warsaw Pact nations are more highly standardized, spending by the US and its NATO Allies adds less to the common defense than an equal amount of spending by the Soviet Union and its allies adds to the Warsaw Pact. Under the assumption that allied investments are equally efficient for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Figure 9 below shows that in 1981 Pact investment efforts exceeded NATO efforts by about 20 percent. Owing to the less efficient nature of NATO spending, however, the investment gap between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is actually somewhat greater than portrayed in the chart.

NATO & WARSAW PACT MILITARY INVESTMENT*




Figure 9

Factors Not Considered

The Defense Monitor article fails to take into account several important factors and actions by the Soviets which reflect a continued projection of power throughout the world.

- The comparisons of US/NATO versus Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces ignore a very significant aspect of Soviet power projection--that is the application of military power in gaining world influence.

- The perception The Defense Monitor article gives is that the Soviet's world influence is decreasing. It ignores the approximately 12,000 Soviet military personnel stationed in 24 countries (excluding Afghanistan, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam).

- More importantly, Soviet world influence is increased by the development of surrogates and friendly governments. For example, Cuban and Nicaraguan insurgents in Central America pose new challenges to Western nations.

- For example, Cuba and the Soviet Union have provided ammunition, equipment, training, funding, and advice to the insurgents--to include support of insurgent activities in at least 13 Latin American countries.

- Overall, about 35,000 Cuban military personnel are stationed as Soviet proxies in nearly 20 countries. The coordinated use of these proxies allows Moscow to develop an infrastructure of influence without an overt Soviet presence.


SUMMARY

The Defense Monitor article's statements fail to address the "why" of specific US actions. Disregarding the inaccuracy of many of the statements and inferences, the article fails to address the goals and objectives of the United States. The US objective is deterrence. History has proven that the Soviet Union only responds when countered from a position of strength.

At present there is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet leaders will willingly moderate their efforts to gain military advantage. Increased Soviet prestige and freedom of action have probably confirmed their belief in the tenets of their strategic approach and reinforced their justification of the sacrifices required to implement that approach. The basic nature of Soviet military doctrine is also unlikely to change. The Soviet view of the utility of clearly superior military forces is shared by political and military leaders alike and has deep historical roots. The Soviets are likely to continue to view the translation of military power into political gains as a long-term process, best promoted by persistent diplomatic efforts, covert action, and the steady development of military strength--supported by a pervasive program of propaganda and misinformation.

A central question for the 1980s is whether Moscow will be more inclined to confront the United States in a developing crisis. While the Soviets must still view a US-Soviet conflict as extremely hazardous, they may be more willing to accept the risks of confrontation, particularly where they have significant military and geostrategic advantages.

To counter this possibility, the US must continue to develop and deploy weapon systems capable of deterring the Soviets at any level of aggression.



THE DEFENSE MONITOR

The Center for Defense Information supports a strong defense but opposes excessive expenditures or forces. It believes that strong social, economic and political structures contribute equally to national security and are essential to the strength and welfare of our country.

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Vol. XI, Number 6

1982

U.S.-SOVIET MILITARY FACTS

Defense Monitor in Brief

This issue of *The Defense Monitor* is a collection of the important facts regarding the relative military power of the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies. It is being provided by the Center for Defense Information at the request of many of our readers, and is intended as a handy reference for persons needing an up-to-date assessment of the many elements of U.S. and Soviet military strengths and weaknesses.



Total Nuclear Weapons

- The United States can explode over 12,000 nuclear weapons on the Soviet Union; the Soviets can explode almost 8,000 nuclear weapons on the United States.

- Of the over 12,000 U.S. nuclear weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union, over 2,600 are on F-111's, F-4's, A-6's, A-7's and other "tactical" aircraft which could fly to the Soviet Union from Europe, Asia, or from aircraft carriers; over 9,500 are "strategic" nuclear weapons.

- Of the Soviets' 8,000, almost 150

are on Backfire bombers which can only hit the U.S. if they fly at airliner speeds, on one-way missions. The remaining 7,800 are "strategic" nuclear weapons.

- Of the more than 9,500 U.S. "strategic" nuclear weapons, half are on submarines which are invulnerable, hidden beneath the ocean. Four hundred more strategic weapons will be added in 1982, bringing the total to over 9,900 U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.

- In addition to strategic nuclear weapons capable of hitting each other's homelands, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have thousands of "tac-

tical" nuclear weapons for use against ship convoys, tank formations, and other targets. As a general estimate, the U.S. and its allies have a total of about 31,000 nuclear weapons and the Soviets have about 20,000. (About 26,000 U.S. nuclear weapons are in the active inventory and 4,000 more in inactive storage.)

- Soviet strategic nuclear weapons carry about 8,000 megatons of explosive power compared to 4,000 for the U.S. As the Soviets begin to catchup with the U.S. in producing smaller, more accurate and efficient weapons, they, too, are reducing their megatonnage.

Defense Secretary and Chairman of Joint Chiefs Would Not Trade Forces

Senator Carl Levin: "I am wondering whether or not you would swap U.S. military capability overall, with everything that is included in that phrase, for that of the Soviets?"

General John Vessey: "... I would take some of the things that the Soviets have for their forces in terms of numbers and give them to our forces, but overall would you trade with Marshal Ogarkov (Chief of Staff of Soviet Armed Forces)? Not on your

life, not to live there or have his job or his responsibilities or to have his forces in comparison to ours."

Senator Levin: "I appreciate your answer. Just focusing on the military capability aspect is your answer that you would not trade?"

General Vessey: "I would not trade."


**Senate Armed
Services Committee**
May 11, 1982

Senator Charles Percy: "Would you rather have at your disposal the U.S. nuclear arsenal or the Soviet nuclear arsenal?"

Defense Secretary Weinberger: "... I would not for a moment exchange anything, because we have an immense edge in technology."

**Senate Foreign
Relations Committee**
April 29, 1982

Nuclear Weapons on Land-Based Missiles (ICBMs) U.S.S.R. 5540, U.S. 2152



Land-Based Missiles

- The number of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is declining. They have 1,398 now whereas seven years ago they had 1,600.
- The Soviets have larger missiles, with greater throw weight than U.S. missiles.
- US weapons are smaller because they have miniaturized, computerized guidance packages, more efficient rocket engines, thinner but more effective heat shields, greater accuracy, and more compact, efficient hydrogen weapons.
- Ninety-five percent of Soviet missiles are old-fashioned, liquid-propelled ICBMs; they carry large nuclear weapons to compensate for inaccuracy.
- Soviet ICBMs are less reliable and less accurate than U.S. ICBMs.
- The Soviets are shifting gradually to more modern ICBMs, with

Soviets Have Nothing Like Superiority


"The Soviets do not have, in my judgement, anything like strategic superiority in the sense of a militarily or politically usable advantage in strategic nuclear forces."

**Former Defense Secretary
Harold Brown
April 30, 1982**

smaller yield warheads—following the U.S.'s lead.

- The U.S. has maintained a level of 1,054 ICBMs but has modernized the missiles by introducing new types from Minuteman (MM) I to MM II to MM III and added 1,100 weapons by MIRVing the Minuteman III.
- The U.S. has completed hardening of Minuteman silos and installation of an improved guidance system which doubles accuracy.
- The U.S. has MIRVed 550 of its 1,000 MM ICBMs and will soon complete retrofitting 300 of these (900 nuclear weapons) with the MK12A warhead, doubling each weapon's explosive power and increasing lethality.
- The U.S. will soon replace 50 MM IIs with MIRVed MM IIIs, adding a net increase of 100 highly accurate weapons to the total ICBM force.
- U.S. solid fuel-propelled MM ICBMs can be launched against the Soviet Union well within the 30 minute time of flight of Soviet missiles. Therefore, Soviet ICBMs launched against U.S. ICBMs might find only empty holes on arrival in the U.S. U.S. ICBMs constantly maintain a 98% alert rate. It is believed that the alert rate of Soviet ICBMs is much lower.
- It will soon be possible to launch U.S. ICBMs by airborne command posts should ground command centers be destroyed.

Nuclear Weapons on Strategic Submarines U.S.S.R. 1970, U.S. 4744



Strategic Bombers

- The Soviet strategic bomber force of 145 planes still includes 100 old, slow, propeller aircraft.
- All 376 operational U.S. strategic bombers are modern high speed jet aircraft. The U.S. also has over 40 long-range bombers in active reserve, and over 200 in storage.
- Over 100 U.S. bombers would be airborne prior to Soviet missile attack against the U.S.
- In addition to strategic bombers, the U.S. has over 400 strike aircraft which are equipped with nuclear weapons aboard its aircraft carriers.
- The U.S. will add 4,350 nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise


U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Most on Invulnerable Submarines




Chart updated from 1981 Pentagon Annual Report.

The U.S. has more nuclear weapons and a better mix of delivery vehicles — submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) and bombers are less vulnerable than ICBM's.

Nuclear Weapons on Strategic Bombers U.S.S.R. 290, U.S. 2640



Total Strategic Nuclear Weapons* U.S.S.R. 7800, U.S. 9536



missiles over the next several years to enhance the capability of its strategic bomber force.

- One of the greatest advantages the U.S. has over the Soviet Union is its air refueling capability. The U.S. has over 600 KC-135 tankers to extend the ranges of its long-range bombers and other aircraft. The Soviets have 30 long-range tankers.

- The U.S. will soon add to its strategic mobility and air refueling capacity by buying new KC-10 tankers and re-engining 300 KC-135s.

Strategic Submarines

- The 62 Soviet ballistic missile submarines carry 950 nuclear missiles (almost 2,000 nuclear weapons) for war against the U.S., Western Europe and China.

- The Soviets maintain day and night about 300 nuclear weapons at sea targeted against the U.S.

- The Soviets maintain a much smaller percentage of their strategic subs at sea than the U.S.

- The U.S. maintains at least 55 percent of its 32 ballistic missile subs at sea at all times (18-20 subs). This will soon be increased.

- The U.S. keeps 3,000 nuclear weapons in position to attack targets in the Soviet Union at all times.

- U.S. subs could wage a protracted nuclear attack on Russia for over 3 months.


- "Just one of our relatively invulnerable Poseidon submarines — less than 2 percent of our total nuclear force of submarines, aircraft, and land-based missiles — carries enough warheads to destroy every large and medium-sized city in the Soviet Union. Our deterrent is overwhelming."

President Jimmy Carter
January 23, 1979

*Including other weapons, the U.S. can explode 12,000 nuclear weapons on the Soviets; they can explode 8,000 on the U.S.

- The U.S. will soon complete the retrofitting of Trident I missiles on 12 of 31 Poseidon subs. The weapons on these new missiles have 60% longer range, are 2½ times more powerful, and are more accurate than the weapons on the Poseidon missiles

U.S. Always Ahead of Soviets in Strategic Weapons



they are replacing. The number of weapons on our 304 remaining Poseidon missiles is being selectively increased.

- Trident I missiles to go on 12 Poseidon and 9 Trident subs will provide 3,000 new nuclear weapons for our strategic arsenal in the 1980's.

- Each Trident submarine, the first of which will go on active patrol in October 1982, can carry enough weapons to target every Soviet city of over 100,000 people. The President's five-year plan calls for 15 Trident subs; the Navy wants 20-26.



Theater Nuclear Forces

- The U.S. has about 6,000 nuclear weapons in Europe, excluding those on ships and submarines.

- The U.S. has over 400 fighter bombers in Europe which can strike all Warsaw Pact nations with nuclear weapons.

- France and Great Britain have over 500 nuclear weapons of their own that can be exploded on the Soviet Union.

- 2,600 of the NATO and U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe can be exploded on the Soviet Union.

- The Soviet Union has been deploying SS-20 intermediate range missiles since 1977. It now has about 300 SS-20s with 3 warheads each (900 weapons) deployed. One-third of these face China.

- The Soviet Union also has 300 SS-4 and SS-5 medium and intermediate range missiles for a total of 600 MRBMs and IRBMs. This is the same number of these types of missiles they had 10 years ago, though because the SS-20 is MIRVed they now carry more weapons.

- The Soviet MRBM/IRBM force has 1/3 less total megatonnage than it had in 1970.

- The U.S. has 180 medium-range Pershing 1a missiles based in West Germany. France has 18 intermediate-range missiles of its own.

- The U.S., the U.S.S.R., France, and Britain all have a substantial number of nuclear weapons for combat in Europe. It is estimated that over 15,000 weapons are allocated di-

At a Glance: Military Resources of NATO,* Warsaw Pact, and People's Republic of China

	NATO	Warsaw Pact	China
Population	626 million	380 million	1 Billion
GNP	\$5,975 Billion	\$2,020 Billion	\$552 Billion
Military Spending	\$256 Billion	\$202 Billion	\$57 Billion
Military Manpower	5.8 million	4.8 million†	4.8 million
Strategic Nuclear Weapons	10,000	7,800	Several Hundred
Total Nuclear Weapons	31,000	20,000	Several Hundred
Tanks	29,000	63,000	11,600
Anti-tank Weapons	400,000+	data not available	
Other Armored Vehicles	54,000	83,000	4,000
Heavy Artillery	17,000	24,000	18,000
Combat Aircraft	12,000	12,000	6,100
Helicopters	12,400	4,500	350
Major Surface Warships	428	281	32
Attack Submarines	232	298	104

*NATO totals include France and Spain.
Sources: NATO, IISS, DOD, CIA, CDI.
Chart by Center for Defense Information

†Excludes some 560,000 Soviet border guard, internal security, railroad, and construction troops.

rectly on both sides for nuclear war in Europe.



Verification Capabilities

- Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. use a vast array of sophisticated and powerful intelligence gathering systems to survey each other regularly, thoroughly and accurately. These systems include photo-reconnaissance satellites, radars and other devices in space, on land, sea, and in the air, which monitor all aspects of weapon testing and deployments. U.S. satellites reportedly can photograph objects 6 inches or less in diameter. U.S. satellites also use infra-red scanning to monitor Soviet missiles.

- The Soviet Union is surrounded by U.S. monitoring stations.

- The U.S. does not depend only on the technical limits of satellite cameras. Electronic and computer techniques are also used to enhance the quality of pictures.

- Both civilian and military officials have repeatedly testified that the U.S. has the capability to adequately verify existing arms control treaties.

- The Soviet Union, the U.S., and Britain have agreed in principle on arrangements for on-site inspection of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

NATO/Warsaw Pact Comparisons

- "In the Central Region of Europe, a rough numerical balance exists between the immediately available non-nuclear forces of NATO (including France) and those of the Warsaw Pact."

Defense Secretary Harold Brown
January 1980

- The Warsaw Pact has 253 active divisions and NATO has the equivalent of 143 divisions when independent brigades are included. NATO divisions are, in general, larger than Warsaw Pact divisions. U.S. divisions average about 18,300 soldiers, Soviet divisions 11,000.

- NATO leads the Warsaw Pact in total manpower in uniform, total ground forces, and total ground forces in Europe.

- The Warsaw Pact has more than a 2-1 edge over NATO in the total number of tanks. The Warsaw Pact has only a 1.54-1 advantage in main battle tanks in Europe.

- NATO has invested heavily in anti-tank weapons and leads the Warsaw Pact in both the quantity and quality of such weapons. NATO deploys over 50 types of anti-tank weapons and a total of almost half a million.

- NATO and the Warsaw Pact have approximately the same number of total combat aircraft.

- The quality of NATO weapons including combat aircraft, artillery, anti-tank weapons, military helicopters, and air launched missiles, exceeds that of the Soviets.

- "What are called static measures of assessment, in which for example, Soviet and American missile or tank inventories are compared in isolation, are rarely illuminating about the expected outcome of a battle or instructive as to the defense posture we should adopt."

Defense Secretary Harold Brown
January 1980

- "NATO forces are well trained and, given the full range of capabilities at their disposal, are capable of presenting a credible defense of Alliance territory."

1982 NATO Report



Naval Comparisons

- U.S. and other NATO navies have twice the naval tonnage and several times the firepower of the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact navies.

- The Soviet Navy, which started far behind us, has also been declining in size recently, not increasing. In certain types of Soviet naval vessels, the decline over the years has been significant. The Soviets have 100 less submarines of all categories today than they had ten years ago.

- NATO has 428 major surface combatants. The Warsaw Pact has 281. NATO has deployed more than twice as many as the Soviet Navy since the early 1960's and will continue to outproduce the Soviets in the future.

- The U.S. has 13 heavy aircraft carriers, the Soviets none. The Soviets have two Kiev ships which are equipped with less capable air-

craft and are comparable in both size and capability to the five U.S. Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships.

- The U.S. continues to hold superiority over the Soviet Navy in performance of critical missions such as strike warfare, amphibious warfare, and anti-submarine warfare, as well as in readiness.

- The U.S. Navy has 553,000 personnel compared to 433,000 for the Soviet Navy.

- The U.S. has 193,000 marines; the Soviets only 12,000.

- The U.S. has major naval bases around the world. The Soviet Union has no naval bases outside of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

- "The Soviet Union must divide its large naval forces between four separate and widely dispersed fleets. It would be extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to utilize ships from one fleet in another theater in the event of hostilities, since these ships must pass through geographical barriers and bottlenecks which are subject to closure by U.S./NATO naval operations."

Department of Defense, 1980



Military Spending

- The Administration proposes spending 1.9 Trillion dollars over the next six years on the military. This means we will spend \$36 million

every hour for the next six years. It will cost a total of more than \$20,000 for every taxpayer in America.

- Seventy-eight percent of all discretionary spending in the federal budget goes to pay for the military.

- The cost of new and often unnecessary weapons continues to escalate. The estimated cost for 44 major weapons systems jumped \$114.5 Billion in the last three months of 1981.


- The U.S. and its NATO allies have outspent the Soviet/Warsaw Pact military forces for many years—\$256 Billion to \$202 Billion in 1980 alone.

- The Administration's claim that the Soviets outspend the U.S. on military forces ignores the contribution of our military allies.


- Official estimates which compare U.S. and Soviet military spending use a C.I.A. methodology based on costing out the Soviet military at U.S. prices. For example, the Soviets pay their soldiers less than 5 rubles (about \$8) per month. The U.S. pays its recruits more than \$500 per month. Yet, Soviet manpower costs are calculated at U.S. wages.

- Because the Soviets have twice as many soldiers as we do (the Soviets face twice as many NATO and Chinese troops as they have in their own forces), every one million dollars we put into pay increases for our troops shows up as a \$2 million increase in the Soviet budget.

NATO Has Always Outspent Warsaw Pact



Anti-tank Weapons Versus Tanks NATO's Strength



• The C.I.A. acknowledges this problem, stating that its dollar cost calculations "overstate Soviet programs relative to the U.S."



Weapons Exports

• The U.S. has provided weapons to about 130 of the world's 161 nations.


• In the 1970's the United States sold or gave away \$123 Billion in weapons, military training, and construction to foreign countries.

• U.S. weapons exports rose from less than \$5 Billion in 1971 to \$17.4 Billion in 1980.

• In his first year in office, President Reagan recommended to Congress over \$25 Billion in arms sales.

• U.S. arms exports in FY 1982 may total \$30 Billion, far exceeding

U.S.'s Overwhelming Naval Power: Aircraft Carriers and Naval Air



NATO Compares Well to Soviets

"Soviet conventional strength is not as great as many state it to be... In my opinion, NATO conventional forces are very strong indeed."

**Former Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara**
April 8, 1982

"We are in the strongest position that we've ever been in when it comes to tactical aircraft."

Brig. Gen. Del Jacobs
U.S. Air Force
Washington Post
June 6, 1982

the previous record high of \$17.7 Billion in 1975.

• Over the past decade, the U.S. has agreed to sell or give away over 6000 tanks, 600 artillery pieces, 3000 military aircraft, 10,000 missiles, and 250 combat ships.

• Only half of all U.S. foreign military sales since 1950 have been delivered, leaving about \$55 Billion of arms in the pipeline.

• Of the 41 military-dominated, repressive governments in the world, the U.S. has been a major supplier of arms to 28.

• In 1980, the U.S.S.R. surpassed the U.S. in arms agreements and deliveries to the Third World for the first time.

• The U.S. is still the number one supplier of weapons to the Third World if one looks at more than the past year or two. From 1978 to 1980, the U.S. sold \$29.9 Billion of arms to the Third World compared to \$26.6 Billion for the Soviet Union.

• The U.S. is still the number one supplier of weapons to the rest of the world if exports to developed nations

The Single Most Important Advantage

"The U.S. Navy's sea-based tactical aircraft and carriers represent the single most important advantage over the Soviet Navy, and are far superior in both numbers and quality."

**Navy Secretary
John Lehman**
March 24, 1981

are included.

- In 1980, all non-communist nations combined accounted for 61% of arms agreements with the Third World, all communist nations for 39%, and the U.S.S.R. alone for 36%.



World Influence

- A comprehensive study of trends of Soviet world influence in 161 countries since World War II does not support perceptions of consistent Soviet advances and devastating U.S. setbacks.

- Outside Eastern Europe, Soviet influence has lacked staying power. Inability to accumulate influence in foreign countries over long periods is a dominant feature of Soviet world involvement.

- Starting from a very low base of political, economic and military involvement, the Soviets worked to increase their influence around the world. Starting with influence in 9% of the world's nations in 1945, they peaked at 14% in the late 1950's, and today have influence in 12% of the world's nations. Of the 161 countries in the world today, the Soviets have significant influence in 19.

- The Soviets have been successful in gaining influence primarily among the world's poorest and most desperate countries.

- Soviet foreign involvement has to a large extent been shaped by indigenous conditions and the Soviets have been unable to command loyalty or obedience.

- Soviet setbacks in China, In-

Soviets Losing Strength?

Robert Scheer: "What about the geopolitical balance? We hear how the Soviets have gotten stronger and how they've made gains all over the world."


Former Defense Secretary

Robert McNamara: "I, myself, believe they've gotten weaker. . . . They are in a weaker position today than they were 14 or 15 years ago."

Los Angeles Times
April 8, 1982

Balance of World Power Favors U.S.

Chart by Center for Defense Information



The Center for Defense Information, utilizing indexes of power developed by former C.I.A. official Ray Cline in his books on *World Power Trends*, has calculated this division of world power, based on demographic, geographic, economic, and military factors.

donesia, Egypt, India, and Iraq dwarf marginal Soviet advances in lesser countries.

- The Center for Defense Information, utilizing indexes of power developed by former C.I.A. official Ray Cline in his books on *World Power Trends*, has calculated this division of world power: Pro-West and China 70%; Soviet Union and its clients 20%; other 10%.

? The Future

- The Pentagon's 5-year plan calls for building a huge new arsenal of weapons which "are difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose disproportionate costs, open up new areas of major military competition and obsolesce previous Soviet investment."

- The U.S. plans to deploy at least 100 MX missiles, the most modern, accurate and lethal ICBM ever built.

- The U.S. is moving forward with the Trident II (D-5) missile which will give submarine-launched missiles the ability to destroy hardened missile silos for the first time.

- The U.S. is building a fleet of at least one hundred B-1B bombers at a cost of about \$40 Billion (\$400 mil-

lion per plane).

- The U.S. is now deploying modern, highly accurate, highly lethal ground, air, and sea launched cruise missiles. Over 9,000 will be deployed (some SLCMs will carry non-nuclear explosives but will be indistinguishable from nuclear-armed SLCMs.)

- The U.S. will build an advanced technology "Stealth" bomber at tremendous cost to replace the B-1.

- The U.S. will deploy the Pershing II medium range ballistic missile in 1983. It will be the most accurate missile ever built and will be able to reach the Soviet Union from bases in West Germany in 5-10 minutes.

- The U.S. is substantially increasing spending on ballistic missile defense and could deploy a new sys-

"U.S. Is Dominant"

"The United States is the dominant military and economic power not only in that [Pacific] theater but also in every other theater of the world."

Admiral Robert Long
Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Forces, Pacific
March 16, 1982

tem in the mid-to-late 1980's.

- The Soviet Union has tested and may have deployed a crude, rocket-launched, anti-satellite weapon system. The U.S. is now testing and will soon deploy a much more sophisticated anti-satellite weapon which can be launched from any modified aircraft.

- The Soviet Union has stated that it will match any U.S. nuclear advance. U.S. authorities acknowledge that the Soviets are capable in the next decade of developing a new manned bomber, advanced cruise missiles, improved submarine-based missiles, super-accurate ICBMs, and new ABM systems.

"U.S. defense policies ensure our preparedness to respond to and, if necessary, successfully fight either conventional or nuclear war."

**Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1983
Executive Office of the President
February 8, 1982**

Force Level Calculator

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Notes:
NATO: Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey.

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